claude-projects/claude-config/config/prompts/agent-sudo-secrets-proxy/SPR_secrets_proxy_retirement_dryrun.md

SPR — secrets-proxy retirement DRY RUN (spawned 2026-10-01, main session 771b2744)

You are a bounded background agent (tracking row personal_projects #174). Budget: --max-turns 35. DRY RUN: inventory + runbook only; you remove/revoke NOTHING. Same-call-twice → STOP with a partial wrap-up.

OWNER DECISION (2026-09-29 grill-me, final — do not re-litigate): RETIRE secrets-proxy, option (c). Approved list: rm container + image; remove the Traefik router + secrets-proxy.reverseproxyserver.net; REVOKE its prod + sandbox AppRole secret-ids, PROXY_CALLERS keys (incl. Jenkins proxy-caller-key), its NTFY bot token (dry-run list first); KEEP api_business.proxy_executions read-only and the Postgres role secrets_proxy as NOLOGIN; Jenkins 24 standard jobs → JH-3 (out of scope here, just list them); security hook → secret-exec skill (list where the hook references secrets-proxy); archive the Gitea repo.

FACTS (main session 2026-10-01 17:50): container secrets-proxy-secrets-proxy-1 exists, Exited (0) 2 months ago; image gitea.local/backtalk6858/secrets-proxy:latest (fd7270fe5f87) present on primary. Research: /opt/appdata/docker/research/secrets_proxy_S1_investigation.md (read it first).

HARD RULES

• NO deletions, revocations, Vault writes, DB writes, container/image removal, Traefik edits, git, sudo. Read-only inspection only. docker inspect is fine; NEVER print env values (no docker exec env, no .env cat — list env KEY NAMES only via docker inspect + python that prints names). Vault: you may LIST paths and READ METADATA (AppRole role names, secret-id accessors via auth/approle/role/<r>/secret-id LIST) using the AppRole login pattern in /home/administrator/.claude/projects/-opt-appdata-docker/memory/playbook_vault_token_rotation.md Step 0 (login → use → revoke-self). If the policy refuses a list, record it as owner-needed, don't escalate.
• Postgres read-only (resolve container: docker ps | grep '^postgres-'; one statement per -c).
• Root needed? → final message headed ⏸ OWNER-COMMAND-REQUEST (host, command, why, paste_back, resume_at).

TASKS

1. Inventory every artifact on both hosts (primary 192.168.1.88, server-01 via ssh administrator@192.168.1.90): containers, images (all tags), compose dir, systemd units/timers, Traefik routers (dynamic files under /data/coolify/proxy/dynamic may be root-only — note it), Cloudflare DNS/tunnel entries referencing secrets-proxy (cloudflared config read-only), Vault roles/policies/paths/secret-id accessors, N8N workflows that call it (read-only API list if you can; else grep exports), Jenkins jobs referencing it, the security hook(s) in ~/.claude and /opt/appdata/docker/.claude that mention it, memory/playbook files that tell agents to use it, ntfy users/topics/tokens for it, Postgres roles/tables.
2. For each: current state, the exact removal/revocation command (FULL, never abbreviated), who runs it (Claude vs owner/sudo), verification command, rollback note.
3. Order the steps safely (revoke creds before removing the code that could re-use them? decide by dependency, explain), flag anything still referencing secrets-proxy that would BREAK on removal.

OUTPUT: /opt/appdata/docker/docker-compose/secrets-proxy/RETIREMENT_RUNBOOK.md (create the dir path's file only if the dir exists; else /opt/appdata/docker/research/secrets_proxy_retirement_runbook_2026-10-01.md). FINAL message = wrap-up JSON only: status, project "secrets-proxy", runbook_path, inventory[] (artifact, host, state, action, runner), breakage_risks[], owner_steps_count, claude_steps_count, actions_taken[], actions_failed[], unverified_claims[], next_step, notes.